The U.S.–Iran Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) is hoped to end the U.S.-Israeli war against Iran, which began on 28 February 2026. However, the war has raised grave concerns about the underlying vulnerabilities of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) states: the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates (UAE), Qatar, Kuwait, Bahrain and Oman.
At the centre of the debate lies a fundamental question: can the GCC’s long-standing business model, built on geopolitical stability, open trade routes, energy exports, foreign investment and its role as a hub linking East and West, remain viable in an era of escalating regional conflict?
The model depends on the region being an oasis of peace, stability and opportunity for investors, tourists, students, talent and both highly and lower-skilled migrants. This is especially true for Saudi Arabia, the UAE and Qatar, whose mega “Vision” initiatives aim to diversify their economic foundations away from oil and strengthen their geopolitical standing by attracting a wide range of capital and investment.
These initiatives are also intended to position the region as a hub for aviation and maritime transport, finance, real estate, tourism, entertainment, retail, education, manufacturing and exports.
Freedom of navigation and, more broadly, hyper-mobility depend on geopolitical and terrestrial stability, which in turn determines maritime security. That stability is currently threatened by a growing geopolitical interregnum in which the international rules-based order is being eroded.
In particular, the UN Charter’s prohibition on the use of force, the law of the sea, international humanitarian law and international human rights law are being violated with impunity in many parts of the world, including in and by Middle Eastern states.
The war in the Middle East is undermining the GCC business model. More specifically, with regard to migration, the model depends on large-scale inflows of tourists, highly skilled professionals, labourers and irregular migrants across a range of skill levels, drawn by comparatively high wages and employment opportunities.
According to the International Organization for Migration’s 2025 Region on the Move report, the Middle East hosted 44.1 million international migrants in 2024. Roughly 70% of them, approximately 30.9 million people, reside in the six GCC states, making the Gulf the region’s principal migration destination.
Migrants account for nearly 55% of the GCC’s total population of approximately 56 million, one of the highest proportions of any region in the world. Saudi Arabia and the UAE rank among the world’s 10 largest migrant destinations.
Only Oman, where nationals account for approximately 60% of the population, and Saudi Arabia, at approximately 58%, retain national majorities. By contrast, foreign citizens account for approximately 88% of Qatar’s population and 87% of the UAE’s.
These figures underscore the GCC’s deep structural dependence on foreign labour, particularly in the private sector, and the demographic imbalance underpinning its economic model.
Egypt, Sudan and Yemen are major countries of origin. Saudi Arabia alone hosts approximately 3.15 million Egyptian migrants, while the UAE hosts a further 985,000, underlining Egypt’s position as a major labour-sending state.
The war is disrupting mobility in and migration to the region, with markets further removed from active conflict, such as Türkiye and Morocco, positioned to benefit.
The strain is already visible at the top of the mobility ladder. According to Henley & Partners’ May 2026 update, demand among Lebanese and Israeli citizens for alternative residence and citizenship arrangements has surged, while interest in UAE programmes has declined and demand for Türkiye’s programmes has increased.
Two critical factors will determine the impact on, and future of, migration and mobility from Africa to GCC countries and the wider Middle East.
First, much depends on whether a durable ceasefire and peace can be secured, thereby avoiding a relapse into conflict. The second determining factor is the extent of the war’s economic impact and the resilience of GCC economies.
Accordingly, three broad scenarios can be outlined for migration and mobility from Africa.
Scenarios for mobility and migration
Scenario 1: Optimistic
The MoU and ceasefire hold and lead to a negotiated settlement, resulting in the full reopening of the Strait of Hormuz, the normalisation of maritime insurance premiums and the recovery of oil revenues.
The GCC enters a phase of post-war reconstruction and economic recovery and once again becomes a magnet for trade, investment, tourism and skilled labour migration. This produces a surge in demand for skills in hospitality, transportation, construction, infrastructure, engineering, healthcare and security services.
Countries of origin and migrants become more risk-conscious, forcing GCC states to compete for labour through wage premiums, insurance schemes and a renewed push for kafala reform, including improved contract enforcement, greater job mobility and more effective grievance-handling mechanisms.
GCC states extend amnesties to migrants with expired visas or those who have overstayed. The treatment of migrants from the Global South improves, and recruitment becomes more diversified.
African labour corridors involving countries such as Egypt, Sudan, Kenya, Uganda and Ethiopia are increasingly formalised through bilateral agreements.
Under this scenario, the war becomes a catalyst for better-governed migration in which migrants’ human rights are protected and respected, particularly because GCC countries and their populations have experienced first-hand the impact of war and violations of fundamental rights, including the right to life.
Scenario 2: Realistic
Harsh realities on the ground point to a scenario in which the MoU produces a fragile ceasefire, punctuated by periodic relapses and continued economic volatility.
The Strait of Hormuz remains operational, but at elevated cost and risk. GCC economies recover unevenly, and reconstruction projects begin but proceed slowly, with some projects scaled down.
This volatility and uncertainty force investors, tourists, students and highly skilled migrants to reconsider migration to the GCC, potentially opening greater space for lower and medium-skilled migrants.
Labour migration consequently resumes on a two-track basis. Lower-skilled migration rebounds relatively quickly in the absence of better alternatives, while highly skilled migrants in sectors such as finance, technology, energy and security, together with investors and students, increasingly seek opportunities elsewhere.
Recruitment carries new “risk premiums”, while the return of investors, tourists and highly skilled workers who left the region is likely to be considerably slower.
Scenario 3: Pessimistic
Under this scenario, the region relapses into war because of violations of the MoU or the collapse of the 60-day negotiations. The GCC and the wider Middle East then face extended and deepening insecurity and volatility.
The Strait of Hormuz is closed for extended periods and GCC territory is directly targeted. Oil revenues contract sharply, fiscal pressure increases and major infrastructure and diversification projects are frozen or significantly scaled back.
The uncertainty generated by the war undermines the GCC’s diversification strategy, which seeks to reduce dependence on hydrocarbons by shifting towards private-sector-led growth.
An economic depression drives away investors and highly skilled migrants, while the region struggles to attract new investment and talent. This produces severe and rapid consequences for migration.
The exception of irregular migration
Another version of this scenario, as witnessed in comparable conflict zones, is that irregular migration is only marginally affected, provided wages in the GCC remain higher than those available in migrants’ countries of origin.
African migrants in the Middle East are often familiar with war and insecurity, particularly those originating from or travelling through Sudan, Ethiopia, Eritrea, Yemen and Libya.
Those higher up the mobility ladder are generally more affected by state failure and war than irregular migrants. Irregular migration along dangerous routes may therefore remain largely unaffected, particularly along the “Eastern Corridor” to Saudi Arabia and other Gulf states.
This corridor stretches from the Horn of Africa across the Red Sea and Gulf of Aden into Yemen. Close to half a million irregular migrants travelled along this deadly route in 2025, with approximately 506,600 movements recorded during the year.
Conclusion
The Gulf’s prosperity has long depended not only on hydrocarbons but also on its reputation for durable peace and stability. The war with Iran has eroded that credibility and destabilised the assumptions underpinning the region’s economic and business model.
The three scenarios—reconstruction-led recovery, fragile normalisation or sustained economic downturn—will be shaped less by domestic economic planning than by the wider geopolitical settlement and the resilience of the ceasefire.
For African migration, these dynamics will play out unevenly across the mobility ladder. Highly skilled professionals, investors and students will diversify their options and increasingly look elsewhere. Lower and medium-skilled workers, who have far fewer alternatives, will continue to migrate, while irregular flows along routes such as the Eastern Corridor are likely to remain largely unchanged.
The result is likely to be a sharply stratified migration regime in which protecting those without the means or opportunity to leave becomes a central governance imperative.
Image: Mosbatho / Wikimedia Commons
